Talk:Hamas

Lede

@Hemiauchenia: Lede is a summary of the body; readers do not expect to read every single country that has designated Hamas as a terrorist organization as much as they do not expect to see every single country that does not see it as such. The burden of achieving consensus lies on yourself as the inserter of these details. [1] Makeandtoss (talk) 12:45, 20 October 2024 (UTC)

This has been the stable compromise consensus for months in this page without objection, check the page history. People have inevitably quibbled about how Hamas's designation as a terrorist organisation should be characterised, from "many countries" to "a few Western countries", and just listing them seems to have provoked the least objection. It's not all the countries either, as Paraguay is not listed due to lack of significance. Hemiauchenia (talk) 15:42, 20 October 2024 (UTC)

One version of the Western World

Just saying "western" can be misleading as not everyone would agree that Japan, Israel and Paraguay belong to the "West". Alaexis_¿question? 22:19, 20 October 2024 (UTC)

Then obviously the correct phrasing would be "a number of western countries". Consensus can be challenged and developed. I see no reason why we list the pro-terrorism label countries and not the ones opposing it. NPOV should be restored. Makeandtoss (talk) 13:59, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

What countries oppose it? Not designating Hamas as terrorists is not the same as opposing such designation. Also, there are also non-Western countries that designated it as a terrorist organisation. Alaexis_¿question? 20:30, 21 October 2024 (UTC)

58 countries in the United Nations opposed this desgination. So we are clearly giving way more due weight to one side here. Addressing your concerns, I think the best middle ground solution that we came with here is replacing the list with this summary: "a number of western countries". @Alaexis: @Hemiauchenia: Makeandtoss (talk) 07:50, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

What I don't understand exactly is why in the entry for the KKK article it says terrorist group and in the entry for Hamas or Al-Qaeda

it is not mentioned in the heading Hastengeims (talk) 22:13, 16 November 2024 (UTC)

1988 Charter

Re: this thread from last month, which was already archived

Shouldn't the [never-revoked] 1988 Charter be properly introduced in the lead (and not just in relation to the 2017 charter)? Removed here. BobFromBrockley (talk) 10:58, 3 October 2024 (UTC) Pinging Makeandtoss - was it the word "genocidal" (which I thought summarised body, but could easily be dropped)? BobFromBrockley (talk) 14:21, 3 October 2024 (UTC)

As the most-referenced document in the org's history, it was noticeably buried in the lede. Most coverage of Hamas before 2017, and most discussions of the new 2017 document, address the uncompromising calls for jihad in the 1988 document. Your previous edit also felt a bit out of the flow however, and there's also a bit of duplication in that paragraph. I took a pass at cleaning it up w/ existing language. – SJ + 22:59, 8 November 2024 (UTC)

There is a particular confusion about the relationship between the 2017 Hamas policy document and the 1988 covenant/charter which I've only seen on Wikipedia: whether discussions about the history of Hamas as a movement should describe its purpose and principles in terms of the 2017 document, and how much space to devote to discussing 'differences' between 1988 and 2017 documents (which are in no way two revisions of the same text, in length or scope or language).

I used the term 'policy document' for the 2017 doc when it is introduced for the first time, to avoid that confusion. – SJ + 01:09, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

What exactly is the confusion about the 2017 Hamas charter that is explicitly referred to as such in the cited RS, and its relationship to the 1988 charter which is explained concisely and clearly per the cited RS?

Regarding whether the purpose and principles of Hamas ought to also be described in terms of the 2017 document (it is not solely done so), and how much space to devote to the difference between that and its 1988 charter, I am open to suggestions on how to alter that, but the changes you made did not adequately reflect the cited RS, and for some reason minimized the import of the former in favor of the latter, despite the fact that that is the new charter. The name change from "2017 charter" to "document" that you put through the entire article further reflects that. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 01:53, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

Hello RR, the point of confusion I meant is captured by the phrase "While the 1988... the 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language", which implies a) that there is a single bit of 'antisemitic language' in 1988 to remove, b) that 2017 revised 1988 rather than being an additional complementary document, c) that there is no antisemitic language in 2017. These specific claims are not made in the sources, and there are better ways to summarize differences between the two charter/documents than by using the language of 'removal'.

Something that notes that the 2017 principles toned down certain kinds of language, while still being considered antisemitic in less obvious ways, might better capture what a range of analysts seem to say about the two documents in relation to one another, and in relation to the interviews with movement leaders saying that the new publication reflects not a change of principles but an adaptation to a changing environment.

I tried to clean up less contentious parts of that paragraph, which should introduce the original charter when discussing the origins of the movement around 1988, but left the last sentence for discussion here. – SJ + 23:22, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

"These specific claims are not made in the sources, and there are better ways to summarize differences between the two charter/documents than by using the language of 'removal'."

This is not true. The first cited source, Seurat, explicitly states this: "Another noteworthy change: the anti-Semitic overtones of the Charter were entirely scrapped, replaced by a distinction made between the struggle against Zionism and enmity against the Jews."

And there are many other RS that say the 2017 charter removed anti-Semitic language. Here is one published earlier this year that explicitly uses the same phrasing, saying "anti-Semitic clauses were removed" in the 2017 charter.

And here is another: "The new document contains none of the anti-Semitic articles and sentences that characterized the charter. Supporters of the movement, especially in the West, advised it long ago to change these provisions."

I will add that as an additional source.

I'm not sure why you are making a claim that is simply false and then removing content under the guise of "stylistic cleanup" when it's clearly a major POV changing edit that requires consensus to go ahead.

Please seek consensus for it first before editing that again. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 23:34, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

Sorry, but are you addressing me? I can't tell. First of all, lede is a summary of body, and it is already too long, so it needs trimming, not expansion. Second, the charter is already briefly mentioned in lede and anything beyond that is undue weight. It's not buried in the lede, its charters are already mentioned twice. Due weight is not determined by how much publicity something gets in public, particularly pro-Israeli, circles. Makeandtoss (talk) 07:37, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

• I also want to add that while the 1988 charter's mention appears later, the charter's ideas are not "buried in the lead". The second sentence says "While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine" – this is the core idea for which Israelis have a problem with Hamas, that they seek to replace Israel with a single state. Would it be better to rephrase this as "While initially seeking to replace Israel with a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine"? Raskolnikov.Rev, Sj, Makeandtoss, Bobfrombrockley.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:31, 10 November 2024 (UTC)
• Sj, I find in this edit you misrepresent sources, but maybe I'm mistaken. You changed "began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements" to "began referencing 1967 borders". Did you read the sources cited before you made such a significant change? The sources clearly say that in these agreements Hamas agreed to compromise to a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, not that there was a mere "reference" to is.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 17:14, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

  @Sj Once again made the same edit using the phrasing "referenced" instead of acquiesced even though that is matched in the cited RS. This appears to be an attempt to push a certain POV, which is fine if there is consensus for it, but there plainly isn't. These exact changes were proposed and rejected in the past. I don't know why they're being edited in again without seeking consensus for it in Talk.

  I already expressed my own opposition to changing it and agree with @Vice regent. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 22:40, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  Hi Rev, I left a comment above as well. I don't see "acquiesce" anywhere in Seurat? If anything I'm trying to make the language neutral to the tension within Hamas that she describes throughout that source.

  "Hamas has always oscillated between its attachment to the ‘historical solution’, which foresees the liberation of the whole of Palestine, and its capacity to recognize the validity of the ‘interim solution’, which prescribes the creation of a state with the 1967 borders." (p.20);

  she quotes Abou Musameh in 2012, "For us, the struggle has not ended, and this is why the building of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders remains a tactical goal. For Fatah, the conflict is over; this is why for them it is a strategic aim. We do not believe in a two-state solution. Fatah believes in the two-state solution; this is why they have recognized Israel." (p.48);

  she notes that "Meshal refuses to consider this document as a new Charter: he maintains that this document amends but does not abrogate the original 1988 Charter." (p.68)

  I don't think we should be choosing one or the other side of that tension to describe as 'the position of Hamas'. I'm not partial to 'referenced' but 'acquiesced' implies accepting without protest which in this case seems out of place. How about '[provisionally] accepted'? – SJ + 23:39, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  Several points: Seurat is not the only source cited for that information, and the part of it that is cited matches her description of acquiescing to 1967 borders in the post 2005 period. In fact the passage is quoted in the cited source: "Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012." pp. 17–19.

  There are many other parts in her text where she reiterates this point, for example p. 47:

  "Palestinian factions, the Prisoners’ Document, also called the National Conciliation Document (Wathîqat al-Wifâq al-watani). This text implicitly recognized the validity of the June 1967 borders and agreed on limiting resistance to the land occupied in 1967."

  p. 199:

  "Signed in June 2006 by Hamas and other Palestinian factions, the Prisoners’ Document implicitly recognized the June 1967 borders, agreed on the construction of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as a capital and accepted limitations to the resistance in the territories occupied in 1967. It was approved on 28 June 2006, following consultations with the entire Political Bureau, whose extensive participation was confirmed by Khaled Hroub,9 Alvaro de Soto and Paola Caridi."

  The question of the 2017 charter being called a charter is not particularly controversial. There are countless RS that refer to it as a charter, they are cited as such, and the 2017 page is titled as such. If you disagree with this phrasing, you would have to make a separate case for why the 2017 charter should not be called that, and gain consensus for it.

  Regarding the use of the phrase "acquiesce", someone already brought this up over a month ago here, and failed to gain consensus that the phrase was not suitable for describing this because somehow not neutral. As I said in that discussion as well, I fail to see how this is the case.

  Acquiescing is I think more suitable than accepting because it contains exactly the reluctant nature of their acceptance of the 1967 borders and the fact that they resolutely opposed it beforehand. This is actually the more neutral phrasing of it.

  I would certainly oppose the addition of "provisionally" as that is simply not backed by the cited RS, but changing it to "began accepting 1967 borders" is also fine. I just see it as less accurate than "began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed", so that's still my preference. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 00:14, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

RfC: Semantics and Contents of Recognition of Israel Section

There are three questions:

1. Should the section on the recognition of Israel by Hamas discuss hypothetical recognition (whether Hamas would recognise Israel) and how prominently, based on the sources in the current version?
   1. Yes, in the first sentence as in the current version
   2. Yes, less prominently later in the section.
   3. No
2. Should we mention the Israeli framing of the conflict with Hamas per Kear in the recognition section?
   1. Yes (as in the current version)
   2. No
3. How should we include Usher's 2006 opinion?
   1. In the recognition section without the year (as in the current version)
   2. In the recognition section with the year
   3. In the evolution of positions section
   4. Nowhere in the article.

This is a revised version of a previous RfC.

Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:12, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

Survey (RfC: Semantics and Contents of Recognition of Israel Section)

• Procedural close: The question starts of by making a statement of fact about Hamas' recognition being hypothetical, which is a POV. This is not a brief, neutrally worded question. TarnishedPath^talk 07:29, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  Here "would" is used to describe a hypothetical situation. I'm fine with replacing the current wording with "...discuss whether Hamas *would* recognise Israel..." if that helps and if the editors who have participated in the rfc don't mind. Alaexis_¿question? 21:18, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  @Alaexis What's the proposed change, sorry? Change Should the section on the recognition of Israel by Hamas discuss hypothetical recognition (whether Hamas would recognise Israel)... to "Should the section on the recognition of Israel by Hamas discuss whether Hamas would recognise Israel..." ? Smallangryplanet (talk) 16:00, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

  Considering that we've got a new answer to this question, I don't think it's a good idea to change the wording at this point. Would-statements describe hypothetical situations - there is nothing non-neutral here. I would've be fine with the alternative I suggested but if we restart this whole thing again we'd be really testing the patience and attention span of uninvolved editors. Alaexis_¿question? 22:26, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

  Righto, I'll leave it alone. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:04, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Q1

• 1B, the sources don't support that there is a debate, it's a violation of WP:FALSEBALANCE (see more). Alaexis_¿question? 21:24, 11 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1B, it is hypothetical and there isn't agreement among secondary sources. – SJ + 22:07, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1B per Alaexis and Sj. Andre🚐 23:04, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1A There is RS, cited on the page right now, showing there clearly is debate on the matter with scholars saying there would be such recognition. That's just a factually accurate description of the cited RS. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 12:47, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1A As I've said ad nauseam up and down this page, there's RS showing that there is debate, there is debate on this here talk page, we're quite simply describing reality. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:14, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Q2

• B. No. I don't see that Kear is the most germane here. Andre🚐 23:08, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• A. Yes The cited RS is from a reputed subject-matter scholar, Martin Kear, whose book is specifically focused on this topic, and whose insights cited in the section are directly relevant to the question of recognition. See no reason whatsoever to remove this, but I agree with @VR's trim suggestion here. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 12:53, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• A. Yes @VR / Raskolnikov.Rev trim suggestion is fine but otherwise I think it makes sense to keep this, Kear is a subject matter expert who is regularly cited on this topic (you can find plenty more citations with a google news search) and should be included here. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:14, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Q3

• 3 A. Usher's statement is notable and there's no clear reason to have a date (which is given in the citation). If we started putting dates on every sentence in this article, it would become an unreadable mess.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:35, 10 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3 C. It was 18 years ago, lots of things have happened since then, including Hamas rejecting the two-state solution. It's like saying that Israel is ready to give East Jerusalem to Palestinians now because it was offered in 2008. Alaexis_¿question? 21:53, 10 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3C, even evaluations of what signing the prisoner's document meant changed in the years after 2006. – SJ + 22:07, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3C per Alaexis and Sj. Andre🚐 23:05, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3 A As I noted in the discussion here, Graham Usher is a subject-matter expert whose cited point on the page is not conditional, and in fact later events only further bolstered its accuracy. So there is no reason to remove this RS, and no reason to artificially make it appear as being conditional by adding a year specification. The Kear and Baconi back it up as well. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 12:58, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3 A for the same reasons as @VR. There is no indication that Usher's opinion changed, either. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:14, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Discussion (RfC: Semantics and Contents of Recognition of Israel Section)

• Comment, can the filer of this RFC advise what has changed since Talk:Hamas/Archive 23#RFC: Should Hamas be described as accepting the 1967 Israeli borders in the lead? that this is being relitigated? TarnishedPath^talk 07:21, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  Pinging @KlayCax, @Vice regent, @RadioactiveBoulevardier, @Bharell, @Iskandar323, @Senorangel, @Cjhard, @Penguino35, @Alaexis, @Mhhossein, @Aquillion, @חוקרת, @Selfstudier as editors who were involved in the discussion at Talk:Hamas/Archive 23#RFC: Should Hamas be described as accepting the 1967 Israeli borders in the lead?. TarnishedPath^talk 07:37, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

• At least if I read right, this RFC is talking solely about the Recognition of Israel section, whereas the previous RFC was just about the acceptance of borders in the lead of the article. While of course the two should line up, I don't think any of the options here contradict the lead - the current version of the lead says While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In 2017, Hamas released a new charter that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel. I would think that recognizing borders and accepting Israel are the same thing, but that second sentence is well-cited, so apparently not and Hamas itself draws a distinction between these two things, which means the outcome of the previous RFC doesn't tell us anything about how to handle the recognition section in the body. Perhaps we could have a sentence in this section that mirrors the one in the lead, though, with a bit more detail on the distinction between accepting borders and recognizing Israel (though some of the quotes seem to tacitly touch on it.) --Aquillion (talk) 19:40, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

• Comment on clarifying that sentence in the lede emerging from the previous RFC: from a different ongoing discussion, in that sentence in the current lead "acquiescing" seems too strong, as per the artful sidestepping VR quotes below. Also the phrase "in agreements signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006, and 2007" seems a direct quote from Seurat but it is confusing – only the 2006 prisoner's document mentions borders, and it was more than an agreement signed with Fatah. What were the other agreements? They are not mentioned in the body, nor is any trend during 2005-07 mentioned in that way in the body. – SJ + 22:07, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Q2: Kear's opinions

"According to Martin Kear, Israel treats "any form of resistance from Palestinians as acts of terrorism", and therefore responds to any resistance with extraordinary force. In contrast, writes Kear, Hamas operationalizes "...its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad ... Accordingly, Hamas refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor..."[148]" The above statement, in its entirety appears to be irrelevant to discussion of whether Hamas recognizes Israel. "recognise Israel as a legitimate actor" is not related to diplomatic recognition of whether Israel has a claim to pre-1967 territories. Not all instances of the word "recognise" mean the same thing, and its clear from the context here that its not talking about diplomatic recognition. But the following does appear to be relevant:

"However, Kear goes on to note that without expressly stating it Hamas agreed to respect the Oslo Accords, and by extension Israel's existence: "The signing of the 2007 Mecca Agreement also meant that Hamas had met two of the three stipulations set down by Israel and the Quartet: recognising Israel and respecting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements."" However, it is slightly misleading. Earlier in the paragraph, Kear does indeed say Hamas had "artfully sidestepped the ideological black hole tied to any explicit recognition of Israel's right to exist. Hamas's leadership demonstrated a willingness and ability to push through this key ideological concession to remain an integral player in the Palestinians politics."

So it seems Kear is saying, correctly, that Hamas implicitly recognized Israel by agreeing to a Palestinian state on only WB and GS, but refrained from giving any explicit recognition of Israel. This should be made clear.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:48, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

I would rephrase it as this. "Martin Kear points out that in the 2007 Mecca agreement, Hamas agreed to respect PLO's previous agreements with Israel, including the Oslo Accords that Hamas had previously criticized. After the Mecca Agreement, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal said any future agreement with Israel must establish a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and an acknowledgement of the Palestinian right of return. Kear interprets this statement as Hamas further implicitly recognizing Israel, while withholding explicit recognition." VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 06:23, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

That Hamas "implicitly recognised" Israel is a viewpoint shared by some (though by no means all) observers and it's already mentioned in the first paragraph of the section, so there is no need to repeat that.

The reader may wonder having read that why Hamas is not ready to explicitly recognise Israel, and Kear provides the explanation: the religious framing of the conflict. This is not found elsewhere is the article and clearly notable. Alaexis_¿question? 21:44, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

No, Kear says Hamas' not giving explicit recognition of Israel has more to do with it withholding recognition as a bargaining chip. This is, incidentally, Baconi's position as well. The part about "recognise Israel as a legitimate actor" isn't about diplomatic recognition. The word "recognise" is a polyseme.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 06:49, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

I'm not opposed to mentioning the "recognition as a bargaining chip" perspective in the section again. That shouldn't be controversial, we don't need an RfC for that.

As to the semantics of the word recognition, the section doesn't only deal with the diplomatic recognition narrowly defined. Alaexis_¿question? 22:28, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Kear’s research, according to his profile blurbs on various platforms, is focused on a specific analytical framework and may not be applicable outside said framework. Anyway, I am not sure there is not a WP:DUE problem. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 05:46, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Q1: Hypothetical recognition

The sentence Whether Hamas would recognize Israel is debated should not be the first sentence of this section. We should start with facts rather with WP:CRYSTALBALL speculations. It's like starting the article about the Golan Heights "Whether Israel would return the Golan Heights to Syria is debated" [2].

The "debate" framing is not supported by the sources. The USIP source actually states that "Hamas might never 'recognize' Israel in the conventional sense" - this is not evidence of debate, but rather the opposite [3]. The Haaretz article refers to a single statement by Abu Marzouk suggesting possible recognition, which was directly contradicted by Abu Marzouk himself just one week prior when he explicitly rejected recognition of Israel [4] The overwhelming preponderance of statements from Hamas leadership consistently reject recognition.

This creates a WP:FALSEBALANCE issue - we're presenting a single outlier statement as equal to the organization's consistent official position. Khaled Hroub's analysis of conditions under which Hamas might theoretically recognize Israel can be included later in the section but it should not be presented as the leading framing. Alaexis_¿question? 21:59, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

I think the sentence could definitely be tweaked to provide more context, but it's not WP:CRYSTALBALL - that policy is that we're not supposed to speculate about the future ourselves. Predictions by experts about what Hamas might do or accept in the future, on the other hand, are highly relevant to this article and ought to be covered. We could find more sources for it, but I do think that it's sort of the entire purpose of the section; the article is already clear that Hamas doesn't recognize Israel currently (that's implied by the first sentence of the section) and sources indicating that it doesn't do so don't contradict people talking about the future. Nor is a source saying Hamas might never 'recognize' Israel in the conventional sense, emphasis mine, really in contradiction with it - that describes the possibility as something debatable, which is what our article says! --Aquillion (talk) 19:47, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

Well, the question is why we should center the hypothetical future recognition rather than the current and historical reality. I'm not opposed to mentioning it somewhere in this section btw. Also, there are major issues with sourcing for this statement. Alaexis_¿question? 21:27, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

Q3: inclusion of Usher's opinion

Usher wrote it in 2006 before the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, several small-scale conflicts between Hamas and Israel, the 2017 document and the current war. There are many sources published in the last 5-10 years that deal with the policy of Hamas. We don't need it in this section, we should rather move the sentence to the Hamas#Evolution of positions section. Alaexis_¿question? 21:59, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

Why can't it be in both places? It's clearly relevant to Hamas' recognition of Israel.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 06:46, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

For the same reason why we can't say in present tense that Israel offers East Jerusalem to the Palestinians because they did it in 2008. Lots of things have happened since then, including Hamas rejecting the two-state solution. Also, dozens of books and scholarly articles have been published more recently and we should use those when talking about the current situation. Alaexis_¿question? 21:34, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

The first link is from 2019 and seems like a typo, and the second link quotes Meshal after he was no longer the leader of Hamas. We wouldn't say "the United States considers Israel to be an apartheid state" based on the writings of an ex-president. You're most welcome to quote recent sources, but you don't seem to have done that.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:49, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Thanks, I've fixed the typo. Haniye, the head of Hamas, said in 2020 that one of the principles of Hamas is 'Palestine from the sea to the river' around 11:40. Maybe in your opinion this is consistent with "accepting Israel as a political reality" but many scholars disagree with that.

I'm happy to include those references, but lets clarify them first.

• Nasir Faeq on page 33 quotes (Hroub 2000) and "guidelines [that] are summarized in a statement by the Political Bureau of Hamas dated April 1994" as saying Hamas wouldn't recognize Israel. There appear to be no references later than 2000 that Faeq quotes in which Hamas rejects recognition, correct?
• Alsoos quotes Hamas's 1988 Charter as rejecting Israel's recognition (page 6 and 7) before noting that "However, after its electoral victory in 2006, Hamas did not implement the Charter as policy, but instead agreed to work within the Palestinian political system based on secular Basic Law." It also quotes Haniyeh saying "Hamas will not recognize the Zionist entity" in 2003. Again, there appear to be no references later than 2003 of Hamas rejecting recognition, correct?

So there don't appear to be any contradiction here. It seems Hamas was adamant about not recognizing Israel prior to 2005-ish, when it starting signing agreements that accepted the 1967 borders.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 03:55, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

References

Proposals

1

I'm going to propose different wording options, please give me feedback and I'll amend my proposal accordingly.

Hamas's leaders have emphasized they don't recognize Israel. But, Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders (such as the 2006 Prisoners' document and the 2007 Mecca agreement), thus acknowledging the existence of another entity on the other side. Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated.

Mousa Abu Marzook, then the vice-president of Hamas' Political Bureau, explained his party's position in 2011: while Hamas did not recognize Israel as a state, it considered the existence of Israel as "amr waqi" (or fait accompli, meaning something that has happened and cannot be changed). He called this "de facto recognition" of Israel. Likewise, Graham Usher writes that while Hamas does not consider Israel to be legitimate, it has accepted Israel as political reality.

In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto." But it did not abrogate the old charter, and other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.

Tareq Baconi explains that Hamas' implicit recognition of Israel is in contrast to most Israeli political parties who have long opposed the idea of a Palestinian state.

VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 07:03, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Looks pretty good to me. TarnishedPath^talk 07:29, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

This is a bit better but still has NPOV issues. I'd suggest waiting until we get external feedback via the RfC, otherwise it can lead to confusion. Alaexis_¿question? 22:45, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

I also support this version. It would have been better to have gotten to this right away instead of having a convoluted RfC with 9 options. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 13:15, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

+1 on supporting this version (as mentioned in the survey) Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:24, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

2

Hamas leaders have repeatedly emphasized they do not recognize Israel. But Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders in signed agreements (in 2005, 2006, and 2007) and in its 2017 charter, thus acknowledging the existence of another entity on the other side. Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated. Several scholars have compared Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel to Likud's lack of recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

The 1988 Hamas charter strongly rejected any recognition of Israel. In 1994, the Political Bureau of Hamas repeated this rejection. However, after Hamas won the 2006 elections, it did not implement then 1988 Charter as policy, and instead agreed to work with the existing Palestinian political system. In the 2007 Mecca agreement, Hamas agreed to respect previous agreements between Fatah and Israel, including the Oslo Accords in which the PLO recognized Israel. Both in the 2007 agreement and in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, Hamas agreed to a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Scholars see this as "implicit" recognition of Israel because by accepting a Palestinian state limited to the 1967 borders, Hamas acknowledged the existence of another entity on the other side.

Mousa Abu Marzook, then the vice-president of Hamas' Political Bureau, explained his party's position in 2011: while Hamas did not recognize Israel as a state, it considered the existence of Israel as "amr waqi" (or fait accompli, meaning something that has happened and cannot be changed). He called this "de facto recognition" of Israel. Likewise, Graham Usher writes that while Hamas does not consider Israel to be legitimate, it has accepted Israel as political reality.

In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto." But it did not abrogate the old charter, and other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.

Tareq Baconi argues that Hamas has learned from the fact that, in the 1993 Oslo Accords, the PLO made a "historic concession" in recognizing Israel on 78% of the land of historic Palestine (along the 1967 borders), but was unable to convince Israel to recognize Palestine on the remaining 22% of the land. Having already recognized Israel, the PLO was unable to use recognition to extract any further concessions from Israel. Thus, Baconi opines, the lesson for Hamas was that you can't negotiate from a position of weakness.

• Here is a new version with some of the sources Alaexis mentioned incorporated. Thoughts? (Raskolnikov.Rev—TarnishedPath—Alaexis—Smallangryplanet).VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 21:45, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Thanks, I believe that this version is even better but it can be improved, mainly to comply with WP:DUE. I'll respond in greater detail later.

I couldn't find anything about the recognition on page 206 of Brenner's Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. Could you re-check and provide a quote that supports this passage? Alaexis_¿question? 05:45, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis are you looking at a different edition? Here it is on the google books copy: Of equal key importance was Hamas's revised position on the establishment of a Palestinian state. The new document still referred to Palestine as the territory 'from the river to the sea. However, it also added that it accepted the pre-1967 lines as the borders of a Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of return for refugees. While not explicitly saying what would be on the other side of these borders, this nevertheless acknowledged the existence of another entity there. In addition, Hamas expressed that it would be ready to back 'any peace agreement', would it be approved in a popular referendum. These new formulations amounted to nothing less than a de facto recognition of Israel. During its deliberations, the movement had reached an internal agreement on accepting a two-state solution. (Brenner, p.206) Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:13, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

That's weird, I'm looking at the 2017 edition and I can't find this text anywhere in the book. The google books link unfortunately doesn't work for me, it says "no preview available." Google Books says that the book was published in 2016, I dunno, maybe there were different editions indeed.

I'm sure that this text is legitimate, hopefully we'll find the reason for all this confusion.

Btw, which document does Brenner talk about in the excerpt that you quoted? Alaexis_¿question? 20:29, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

@Smallangryplanet Alaexis_¿question? 20:36, 15 November 2024 (UTC)

It is talking about the 2017 Hamas charter. The version I'm looking at was published in 2022, so mentioning the 2017 charter makes sense.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 21:28, 15 November 2024 (UTC)

Thanks, now it's clear! I was confused since the google books link above is to the 2016 edition. Alaexis_¿question? 20:40, 16 November 2024 (UTC)

This is good, but flagging two things: The "Faeq, Nasir; Jahnata, Diego (2020-09-12)" source appears to be published by a pay to play publishing mill so fails WP:REPUTABLE. The authors are also nowhere to be found as working scholars (at least I haven't been able to), and the piece itself is as expected riddled with basic grammatical errors.

Also I think we need an explanation for the de facto acceptance of Israel as a reality and the lack of a formal, official recognition. Baconi is cited but I don't think it covers exactly the three specific points he makes in this regard on the cited page, 230:

"While Hamas may indeed continue to harbor ideological aspirations for the liberation of the entirety of Palestine after such a peaceful settlement, the likelihood that the movement would have popular backing for such a step is likely to be nonexistent if a just settlement is offered. Khaled Meshal has even offered written guarantees to international mediators underscoring this, noting that Hamas would abide by the outcome of any referendum to a peace deal delivered to the Palestinian people, including deals that entail mutual recognition, while stressing that Hamas would not accept those outcomes until the deal is implemented.97

It is more likely the case that Hamas is simply maintaining this ideological intransigence as a negotiating tactic and a matter of principle, tying into the movement’s legitimacy and its effectiveness as an interlocutor. 98 The movement believes that conceding the remaining cards that Hamas still clings to would ensure that Palestinian rights continued to be forfeited, as had happened following the PLO’s recognition of Israel. As one leader explained, “Why should we be forced to explicitly recognize Israel if we’ve already indicated we have a de facto acceptance of its presence?”99

Hamas’s implicit acceptance of Israel has gone far beyond what many Israeli political parties, including the dominant ruling Likud party, have offered Palestinians within their charters. With their refusal to recognize the right of Palestinian self-determination, their insistence that the Palestinian people never existed, and the intermittent resurfacing of the “Jordan option,” several Israeli political parties have long opposed the notion of a Palestinian state.100 In 2013, Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly reneged on his highly touted 2009 Bar Ilan speech in which he spoke of the possibility of a demilitarized Palestinian state.101"

So we have Baconi saying Hamas leaders offered written guarantees to accept any peace deal, including formal recognition, if certified by referendum (it's not only Meshal, but others have reiterated this too at later points) 2) That they are holding on to not extending formal recognition as both a negotiating tactic against the Israelis who have not offered the same in return and they see conceding this as the PLO did as forfeiting their rights, and then the de facto point is made again but that's superfluous here, already noted in the section. 3) It points to many Israeli political parties including the ruling dominant Likud not extending the same acceptance to Palestinians within their charters.

Could this be incorporated in the Baconi paragraph in a trimmed form summarizing these points? Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 15:18, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

@Raskolnikov.Rev thanks for this.

3) I agree that, according to Baconi, Hamas is more accepting of Israel than Likud is of Palestine. However, some sources imply say Hamas is as (not more) accepting of Israel as Likud is of Palestine. Does anyone besides Baconi say Hamas is more accepting than Likud? VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 21:10, 15 November 2024 (UTC)

Here are some sources that say Hamas is more accepting of Israel than Likud and other Israeli major parties of Palestine:

Page 16 and 168-69 of Noam Chomsky Ilan Pappé's "Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel's War against the Palestinians":

"There is no need here to run through the ugly details, but the U.S.- Israel made sure that Hamas would not have a chance to govern. And of course, the two leaders of the rejectionist camp flatly rejected Hamas’s call for a long-term cease-fire to allow for negotiations in terms of the international consensus on a two-state settlement, which the United States and Israel reject, as they have done in virtual isolation for over thirty years, with rare and temporary departures. Meanwhile, Israel stepped up its programs of annexation, dismemberment, and imprisonment of shrinking Palestinian cantons in the West Bank, always with decisive U.S. backing despite occasional minor complaints, accompanied by the wink of an eye and munificent funding."

"Hamas cannot recognize Israel any more than Kadima can recognize Palestine or than the Democratic Party in the United States can recognize England. One could ask whether a government led by Hamas should recognize Israel, or whether a government led by Kadima or the Democratic Party should recognize Palestine. So far they have all refused to do so, though Hamas has at least called for a two-state settlement in accord with the long-standing international consensus, while Kadima and the Democratic Party refuse to go that far, keeping to the rejectionist stance that the United States and Israel have maintained for over thirty years in international isolation. As for words, when Prime Minister Olmert declares to a joint session of the U.S. Congress that he believes “in our people’s eternal and historic right to this entire land,” to rousing applause, he is denying any meaningful rights to Palestinians.8 Often that rejection is explicit government policy, as in 1989, in response to formal Palestinian acceptance of a two-state settlement, when the coalition Peres-Shamir government declared that there can be no “additional Palestinian state” between Jordan and Israel, Jordan already being a Palestinian state by Israeli decision—backed explicitly by the United States. But far more important than words are actions. Israel’s settlement and development programs in the occupied territories—all illegal, as Israel was informed in 1967 by its highest legal authorities and affirmed recently by the World Court—are designed to undermine the possibility of a viable Palestinian state. By providing decisive support for these policies throughout, the United States is taking the same stand. In comparison to this rejection of Palestinian rights, words are insignificant. On Hamas, I think it should abandon those provisions of its charter, and should move from acceptance of a two-state settlement to mutual recognition, though we must bear in mind that its positions are more forthcoming than those of the United States and Israel."

And from their "On Palestine", page 147-48: "In January 2006, Palestinians committed a major crime: they voted the wrong way in a carefully monitored free election, handing control of Parliament to Hamas. The media constantly intone that Hamas is dedicated to the destruction of Israel. In reality, Hamas leaders have repeatedly made it clear that Hamas would accept a two-state settlement in accord with the international consensus that has been blocked by the United States and Israel for forty years. In contrast, Israel is dedicated to the destruction of Palestine, apart from some occasional meaningless words, and is implementing that commitment. True, Israel accepted the road map for reaching a two-state settlement initiated by President George W. Bush and adopted by the Quartet that is to supervise it: the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia. But as he accepted the road map, Prime Minister Sharon at once added fourteen reservations that effectively nullify it. The facts were known to activists, but revealed to the general public for the first time in Jimmy Carter’s book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid. They remain under wraps in media reporting and commentary.

The (unrevised) 1999 platform of Israel’s governing party, Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud, “flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river.” And for those who like to obsess about meaningless charters, the core component of Likud, Menachem Begin’s Herut, has yet to abandon its founding doctrine that the territory on both sides of the Jordan is part of the Land of Israel."

There are also these sources:

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20141011-forget-its-charter-hamas-has-given-de-facto-recognition-to-the-state-of-israel/

https://nena-news.it/hamas-likud-double-standard/

https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/books/story/2023-11-27/avi-shlaim-israel-hamas-war-q-a

And here are sources on Likud and other major Israeli political parties and politicians saying they refuse to accept/recognize Palestine under any conditions:

https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2014-06-03/ty-article/.premium/double-standard-netanyahus-coalition-wouldnt-pass-bibis-test-for-hamas/0000017f-e631-da9b-a1ff-ee7f9a7d0000

https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-likud-mk-says-netanyahu-vowed-hell-never-recognize-a-palestinian-state/

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/18/israels-knesset-votes-to-reject-palestinian-statehood

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/21/israeli-parliament-backs-netanyahus-rejection-of-a-palestinian-state

https://www.972mag.com/there-is-no-status-quo-only-greater-israel/

https://www.uq.edu.au/news/article/2014/11/israel%E2%80%99s-policy-statehood-merits-same-scrutiny-hamas-gets

https://www.timesofisrael.com/likud-opposed-to-a-palestinian-state-says-hardliner-mk/

https://www.thenation.com/article/world/its-time-to-confront-israels-version-of-from-the-river-to-the-sea/

It is well-established that Israeli major governing parties like Likud have refused to recognize Palestinian statehood under any conditions, the constant references to "Judea and Samaria", and this has only increased in recent times with the Knesset passing a resolution opposing Palestinian statehood:

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-07-18/ty-article/knesset-passes-resolution-against-establishment-of-palestinian-state/00000190-c2c6-d13a-ad92-caffa4b90000

So I think it is worthwhile to keep this and if Baconi itself is not sufficient include some of these other RS to back up his position.

Also what do you think about including the point about Hamas giving guarantees that they will accept any peace deal passed by referendum, including explicitly with recognition, and also adding a bit more specific detail on the reasoning behind the bargaining with not extending formal recognition? Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 11:47, 24 November 2024 (UTC)

Yeah, this is a not a reputable journal.

However, there are other sources that confirm that the "liberation" of the whole Palestine remains the goal of Hamas. See for example Hamas in Power (2023), p. 175

“ It views the liberation of territories occupied by Israel in 1967 as a stage in the liberation of Palestine as a one unified entity ”

. Alaexis_¿question? 19:33, 18 November 2024 (UTC)

Sources like the one you cited say that it remains a final stage long-term goal for reasons outlined by for example Baconi. In any case the "Faeq, Nasir; Jahnata, Diego (2020-09-12)" source should be removed for failing WP:REPUTABLE. Can you get to that as well @Vice regent? Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 11:52, 24 November 2024 (UTC)

References

auto archiving delay

Talk page seems to get extremely long (206,066 bytes), which may be a good sign for our desire to discuss, but may also be unconveniently long. In the past (June24) the auto archiving delay has been shorter (21 days or shorter). Today the delay is 25 days. Although it may not quickly help very much for shortening the talk page, I now reduce the delay down to 20 days; it might perhaps even be useful to reduce that delay a bit further. Corriebertus (talk) 10:11, 15 November 2024 (UTC)

The shortening to 20 days had a good effect: the page length has decreased now from 206 k to 110 k bytes. Still it seems to me unpractically (much too) long, though. I suggest to reduce the archiving delay now to 17 days, maybe later to 14 days. Are there serious objections to that? --Corriebertus (talk) 06:50, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 15 November 2024

change to Jeufleuleu (talk) 15:47, 15 November 2024 (UTC)

Not Done. That pdf says "not for distribution" Rainsage (talk) 02:32, 26 November 2024 (UTC)

References

Minor Edit Request: Last Paragraph of History Section Should have Full Name of Ismail Hamiya

The first sentence of the last paragraph of the History section reads: "On 31 July 2024, Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, after attending the inauguration ceremony of Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian." Because Haniyeh was not mentioned before in the article, it should read "On 31 July 2024, Ismail Haniyeh was ...". Note that I linked the name to the article and provided his full name in the proposed edit. In the following sentence, "Yahya Sinwar" should be put in double brackets to link to that article as well. Thank you. Isonomia01 (talk) 03:20, 18 November 2024 (UTC)

I updated these. LizardJr8 (talk) 22:41, 22 November 2024 (UTC)

Terrorist organization

WP:ECR. Abo Yemen✉ 08:40, 27 November 2024 (UTC)
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.
Why isnt it mentioned that theyre a terrorist organization, and only stated that some countries designate it as such? Hamas is objectively a terrorist organization, its extremely misleading to not mention that and only really mention them bring an "Islamic resistance group" ACilb (talk) 06:43, 27 November 2024 (UTC) I don't think your question is very different from someone asking "Why isn't it mentioned in Wikipedia articles that god is great only that some people think god is great. God is objectively great, it's extremely misleading not to mention that and only mention it being a faith-based belief that some people hold". The word 'terrorist' and related words are used tens of times in the article to describe the organization and their activities. Wikipedia does not take a position on the question, it summarizes what reliable sources say about Hamas. As a new non-extendedconfirmed editor, if you want to something changed in the article, you need to submit an edit request. The best way to do that in terms of likelihood of success is by following the WP:EDITXY guideline. Sean.hoyland (talk) 06:59, 27 November 2024 (UTC) God being great is an adjective Hamas being a terrorist organization would be a way to define the group based on their actions. In the front page then being labeled as an Islamic resistance group already makes their actions seem moral to first time readers who aren't going to read the entire article and read about each and every single one of their actions. I think it's misleading to not put terrorist organization in the first page and not objectively define them as such, and there's obviously a big difference between saying God is great then saying Hamas is a terror organization. If you were to say not mentioning God being omnipotent then it would make sense since omnipotent is what defines God being great doesn't. And I'll look into that edit request ACilb (talk) 08:32, 27 November 2024 (UTC)